

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S BARCELONA PROCESS AND
MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY**

by

Richard E. Myrick

December 2000

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

David Yost
Tjarck Roessler

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2000	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The European Union's Barcelona Process and Mediterranean Security			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Myrick, Richard E.				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the Barcelona Process, a European Union initiative launched in 1995 with the goal of building a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Barcelona Process links twelve countries of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea with the European Union. The participants have three goals: shared prosperity, enhanced cultural exchanges, and political stability. This thesis investigates the European Union's objectives in pursuing this process. Three possible motivations are analyzed: promoting prosperity and democracy, expanding a European Union-led trade bloc, or containing instability. The available evidence provides more support for the latter two motivations than the first. This thesis also investigates the North-South divide within the European Union itself, the influence of NATO and the United States, and possible solutions in view of the difficulties encountered thus far in pursuing the initiative's goals.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS European Union, Mediterranean Security, Barcelona Process, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership			15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**THE EUROPEAN UNION'S BARCELONA PROCESS
AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY**

Richard E. Myrick
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.A., California State University, Long Beach, 1985


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2000**

Author:




Richard E. Myrick


Approved by:



David Yost, Thesis Advisor



Tjarck Roessler, Second Reader



Fredrick Rocker, Acting Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the Barcelona Process, a European Union initiative launched in 1995 with the goal of building a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Barcelona Process links twelve countries of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea with the European Union. The participants have three goals: shared prosperity, enhanced cultural exchanges, and political stability. This thesis investigates the European Union's objectives in pursuing this process. Three possible motivations are analyzed: promoting prosperity and democracy, expanding a European Union-led trade bloc, or containing instability. The available evidence provides more support for the latter two motivations than the first. This thesis also investigates the North-South divide within the European Union itself, the influence of NATO and the United States, and possible solutions in view of the difficulties encountered thus far in pursuing the initiative's goals.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	THE EUROPEAN UNION TURNS SOUTH	2
B.	THE BARCELONA DECLARATION	3
C.	MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES	5
D.	THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE	6
E.	THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES	6
F.	THESIS STRUCTURE	7
II.	DEVELOPMENT OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP ...	9
A.	INTRODUCTION	9
B.	THE EMP BEFORE 1969	9
C.	EURO-MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVES	10
D.	THE GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY	11
E.	ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES	13
F.	THE RENOVATED MEDITERRANEAN POLICY	14
G.	PARTNERSHIP	16
III.	THE BARCELONA DECLARATION	17
A.	INTRODUCTION	17
B.	THE BARCELONA CONFERENCE OF 1995	17
C.	MOTIVES AND ACTIONS	18
D.	THE THREE PILLARS	19
E.	THE LOGIC BEHIND THE PROCESS	22
F.	LINKAGE TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS	23

IV.	PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES	27
A.	INTRODUCTION	27
B.	BARCELONA II	27
C.	BARCELONA III	28
D.	OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS	30
E.	THE CULTURAL DIVIDE	32
F.	INSTABILITY AND THE MEPP	34
G.	THE ECONOMIC FACTOR	36
V.	THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE	41
A.	INTRODUCTION	41
B.	NO CAUSE FOR ALARM	41
C.	THE SOUTH	44
D.	THE NORTH	47
E.	PRESSURE TO SUPPORT THE EMP	50
F.	THE DIVIDE'S IMPACT ON THE EMP	52
VI.	NATO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EU	55
A.	INTRODUCTION	55
B.	NATO AND THE MEDITERRANEAN	55
C.	THE NATO MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE	56
D.	NATO'S PURPOSES AND PROBLEMS	58
E.	THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEDITERRANEAN	62
F.	A DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVES	64
G.	THE U.S. AND THE EU: RIVALRY OR COOPERATION? ..	67
H.	GLOBAL TRADE BLOCS	68

I.	TOWARD A GREATER EUROPEAN TRADE BLOC?	69
J.	HEGEMONY AND GLOBALIZATION	71
K.	THE FRENCH FACTOR	73
L.	COOPERATION AND COMPETITION	75
VII.	CONCLUSION	77
A.	INTRODUCTION	77
B.	THE HYPOTHESES	77
C.	EUROPEAN UNION GENEROSITY	79
D.	EURO-MEDITERRANEAN TRADE BLOC	80
E.	REACTION TO INSTABILITY	81
F.	THE STUMBLING BLOCKS	82
G.	SOLUTIONS	83
	LIST OF REFERENCES	89
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	93

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor David Yost for his guidance and encouragement in the development of this thesis. A special thanks to Colonel Tjarck Roessler, whose interest in the Mediterranean and the future of Europe's southern tier provided inspiration for research into the subject.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the end of the Cold War, the field of action of the European Union (EU) has broadened to encompass not only the former Soviet empire but also the Mediterranean. In 1995, the EU initiated the Barcelona Process (BP) with the goal of building a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) between the EU and twelve non-member countries of the Mediterranean littoral.

The 1995 Barcelona Declaration outlined three goals for what became known as the Barcelona Process (BP). First, the twenty-seven participating countries agreed to build a political and security partnership in order to establish a common area of peace and stability. Second, these countries agreed to promote understanding through business, social, and cultural exchanges. Third, the EU pledged to promote prosperity in the region through debt relief and a substantial increase in the EU's fiscal assistance to its Mediterranean partners.

This thesis examines the EU's motivations in pursuing the Barcelona Process. These motivations fall into three general categories: promoting prosperity and democracy, expanding an EU-led trade bloc, and containing instability. The factors of instability of greatest concern to the EU

are illegal immigration, transnational crime, and Islamic fundamentalism. The available evidence provides more support for the latter two motivations than the first.

This thesis also examines the North-South divide within the EU itself. The northern states are much more concerned with conditions in eastern and central Europe, including the former Soviet Union, while the southern states are more preoccupied with the problems of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean. This difference in priorities and its impact on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are evaluated in the thesis.

The roles of both NATO and the United States in the Mediterranean region are examined in the context of their influence on the Barcelona Process. The BP is an EU initiative, and NATO and the United States have not actively participated in its implementation. The effective exclusion of these two major powers in the Mediterranean is examined, particularly in light of the ongoing impact on the BP of the United States-led Middle East Peace Process.

This thesis recommends that the Barcelona Process be reformed to promote a more balanced relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners. Reform measures could include introducing multi-lateralism to replace bilateralism, and the opening of EU markets to competitive

MP exports such as agricultural products. Additionally, this thesis concludes that the prospects for success of the Barcelona Process would be enhanced with the active participation of the United States. Without reforms, the Barcelona Process may stagnate; an opportunity to create a more prosperous and stable region could thus be lost.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the European Union's (EU's) field of action has broadened to encompass not only the former Soviet empire but also the Mediterranean as a whole, with an emphasis on cooperation and integration. While much has been made of the eastward expansion of both NATO and the EU, the EU has also adopted a new orientation southward. The EU's declared objective is to forge a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The development of this partnership has been underway over the past thirty years, but it has only made significant progress since the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. This established what is now known as the Barcelona Process and a broad set of goals for closer cooperation between the EU and all its neighbors to the south. The message has been a strong one. The European Union considers its future linked to the southern Mediterranean. In the words of the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten: "Let me start by stating the obvious: the present and future of the EU and of the Southern Mediterranean countries are inextricably interwoven. We are each others' 'near abroad.'" ¹

¹ Chris Patten, "The European Union's external policy and the Mediterranean: the case for Israel," Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.it/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_134.htm (3 June 2000).

The notion that the present and future of the northern and the southern and eastern littorals of the Mediterranean Sea are interwoven has not always been so obvious. During the Cold War, the EU's political attention, next to its own internal issues, was to the east (the Soviet Union) and the west (North America), but rarely to the south. Although geo-strategically important, the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East were regions to be stabilized and monitored, but not much else. For the EU countries, the formula was simple: import workers and oil, keep out terrorists and poverty. The Mediterranean was considered a natural border that safeguarded the wealthy north.

A. THE EUROPEAN UNION TURNS SOUTH

The most forward-thinking experts and politicians have long pleaded for more EU attention to the southern Mediterranean littoral. In 1972 the EU, then known as the European Community,² began its slow shift to recognizing the countries of the southern Mediterranean littoral as potential partners rather than simply poor or even bothersome neighbors. The reasons usually given for this shift in attitude and action are an unstoppable movement

² David Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 401. The European Economic Community became known as the European Community after the July 1967 "Merger Treaty," and the European Union in 1993 with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.

toward globalization³ (increased free trade and the blurring of cultural differences in the Information Age) and the EU's decision to actively promote peace and prosperity. Globalization trends are seen as signs that neighbors do not have the luxury of ignoring each other if all are to prosper and thrive, as peace and prosperity are held to be indivisible and achievable only through common security.

But there are deeper reasons for the development of the EMP, and they are less about shared goals than mutual problems. The wealthy and complacent north looks across the Mediterranean with trepidation and uncertainty. The poor but burgeoning south looks back with suspicion and envy.⁴ Although the EMP is about building a better future for all, it also concerns shaping that future on a consensual basis.

B. THE BARCELONA DECLARATION

In November 1995, the Foreign Ministers of the fifteen EU countries met with their counterparts from twelve Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. The resulting Barcelona

³ Thomas Friedman and Ignacio Ramonet, "Dueling Globalizations." *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1999, pp. 110-127. Globalization includes the integration of markets, finance, and technologies to "shrink" the world and provide greater access to worldwide markets to more producers and consumers.

⁴ Bernard Lewis, "The West and the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1997, pp. 114-130.

Declaration outlined three goals for what became known as the Barcelona Process (BP).

First, the twenty-seven countries agreed to build a political and security partnership in order to establish a common area of peace and stability. Specifically, partners are to work together to reduce military security threats (including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and non-military security threats (such as illegal immigration, transnational crime, and terrorism).

The BP's second goal involves social, cultural, and human affairs. The heart of this BP goal consists of exchanges to increase mutual understanding. These exchanges link representatives from the civil societies of the BP countries, focusing on business leaders, civil servants, educators, and scientists.

The third cornerstone goal of the BP is prosperity. The economic initiative includes debt relief and a substantial increase in the EU's fiscal assistance to its Mediterranean Partners. Most significant, however, is the plan to establish by 2010 a Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

Some measure of accomplishment can be recorded for the BP. It is no small achievement to bring together these twenty-seven countries, particularly Israel and the PA, for their mutual interest. Cultural exchanges have also been a

success because such activities are typically limited in scope and non-controversial. Association agreements (bilateral agreements regarding trade and other matters between the EU and selected non-EU countries) are signed or nearing signature for all the Mediterranean partners. Efforts to boost production standards to EU levels, the transfer of science and technology, and nearly ten billion euros in aid or loans over the past five years are helping to modernize the economies of the Mediterranean partners. Even if the BP fails to establish a free trade area (FTA) by 2010, tremendous progress in other political, economic, and social areas will have been achieved.

C. MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES

What have been the EU's motivations and objectives in pursuing the Barcelona Process? This thesis investigates three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the EU is attempting to apply its formula for fostering peace through economic cooperation and integration to its Mediterranean Partners. The second hypothesis is that the EU is creating a Greater European Free Trade Area to bolster its ambitions to compete as a geopolitical bloc with the United States and East Asia. The third hypothesis is that the EU has decided to deal more directly with the phenomena it fears the most from the south: crime, immigration, and

terrorism. Whether the EU can achieve its objectives and what unintended consequences will result from its efforts will shape the security of the Mediterranean region for years to come.

D. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

To successfully lead the Barcelona Process, the EU must also overcome the North-South divide within itself. The northern states, of which Germany is the largest, are much more concerned with conditions to the east. The southern states, led by Italy and Spain, are more preoccupied with the problems of the south. France, with both a northern and a southern view, shares the concerns of both. Although the EU has taken great pains to reassure the Mediterranean Partners that EU and NATO enlargement to the east will not distract the EU from its commitments in the south, some analysts, such as Richard Gillespie, remain unconvinced: "The slowness of Euro-Mediterranean developments since Barcelona may be attributed in part to northern priorities relating to eastern-central Europe."⁵

E. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The role of the United States has been as an interested observer. The United States has maintained its

⁵ Richard Gillespie, "Northern European Perspectives of the Barcelona Process," Available [Online]: <http://www.cidob.es/Castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.html> [23 August 2000]. France is considered both a "northern" and "southern" European country, and has taken a leadership role in the BP.

Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea and has provided leadership in NATO and the Middle East Peace Process, but it has not actively participated in the EU's EMP. This thesis will consider whether and to what extent the U.S. military (particularly naval) presence in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea might eventually be seen as an impediment to a peaceful Mediterranean region by some participants in the BP.⁶ The NATO Mediterranean Initiative is not meant to do more than provide a forum for military cooperation with selected Mediterranean states. The United States has not taken a visible leadership position in the NATO Mediterranean Initiative, and some, like Stephen Calleya of the University of Malta, predict long-term negative consequences as a result:

If trends continue as they have been, the Mediterranean is destined to become a geo-strategic cross-cultural zone of indifference. Security risks will multiply, demographic growth will exacerbate economic problems, and the developed world will adopt a selective engagement approach to the area.⁷

F. THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis focuses on the elements of the Barcelona Process and the factors that appear to propel its

⁶ Fred C. Bergsten, "America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?" *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, pp. 20-34.

⁷ Stephen Calleya, "Regional Security Challenges in the Mediterranean," in Blank, Stephen J., ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 108.

development and that will determine its success or failure. The emphasis will be on security issues, but the political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of the Barcelona Process are analyzed as well.

Chapter I introduces the topic and establishes its relevance, outlines the basic questions, and explains the methodology and the organization of the thesis. Chapter II describes the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, including the Global Mediterranean Policy and the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. Chapter III analyzes the Barcelona Declaration, including the political, security, economic, and social pillars of the agreement.

In Chapter IV, the progress of the Barcelona Process is analyzed, as well as the obstacles to its implementation. Chapter V analyzes the extent and nature of a North-South divide within the EU and how it affects the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Chapter VI analyzes the implications for security in the region, including the course on which the EU is steering the Barcelona Process, and the role of the United States. Chapter VII examines prospects for the future and summarizes conclusions about the significance of the Barcelona Process for Mediterranean security.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to review the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). It begins by considering the situation before 1969. It then examines the European Community's efforts to bolster Mediterranean security and cooperation through the Global Mediterranean Initiative and the Renovated Mediterranean Initiative.

B. THE EMP BEFORE 1969

Prior to 1969, a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was non-existent. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951, focused on the establishment of a peaceful Western European order, and as such the Mediterranean was not a part of that equation. Aside from events such as the accession to NATO of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Mediterranean region was not a major area of concern for the ECSC as a whole, except as colonies of specific ECSC member states.

However, the independence of Algeria from France in 1962 marked a sea change in the ECSC's handling of its southern border. Forced to deal with the independent nations that had once been European colonies, European

nations could no longer impose stability by military means. Further, the Cold War rivalry meant that both the Communist East and the Capitalist West were competing for client states within the region. Coupled with the constant threat of war between Israel and neighboring Arab states, the need to stabilize the region with diplomacy and economic aid became more apparent.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War accentuated the need for a greater measure of peaceful contact between the EEC countries and their southern neighbors, particularly due to the belief in the Arab World that the Atlantic Alliance heavily favored Israel at Arab expense. From the context of this regional instability and distrust grew the first attempts to form a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

C. EURO-MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVES

In 1969, the European Community (EC) negotiated preferential trade agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, signifying a shift for these former colonial lands. At the same time, the European Community was looking towards developing stronger economic ties with several other Mediterranean countries. Special trade pacts were negotiated with Cyprus, Greece, Malta, and Turkey with an eye toward a future customs union. These policies of engagement opened the door for real progress in relations

between the European Economic Community and its future Mediterranean Partners (MPs), which had for so long been ignored, colonized, or both by the rich north.

D. THE GLOBAL MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

In 1972 the European Community negotiated a series of bilateral cooperation agreements under the auspices of its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). The special agreements with Cyprus, Greece, Malta, and Turkey were part of this initiative, but were exclusively for countries that might in the future join the European Community. In 1975 the GMP was extended to Israel, and in 1976 Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia also were added. Finally, in 1977, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria signed bilateral agreements and became part of the GMP.

The GMP provided the template for all initiatives to follow, most importantly with primary emphasis on bilateral agreements between each MP and the EC. As such, the GMP was not truly a regional program but instead a series of agreements with individual countries. This approach precluded the need for a potentially difficult and unwieldy conference of all current and potential partners, and allowed the EEC to maintain a position of strength as the senior partner to underdeveloped countries.

The bilateral agreements themselves focused on three areas. First, commercial cooperation reduced tariffs on EC imports of MP products, most notably agricultural products. At the same time, industrial products (including petroleum) were exempted from customs duties. All imports were subject to quotas, however, to protect European producers. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC remained untouched, and was the limiting factor for quotas imposed on MP products.

Second, financial and economic cooperation formalized aid to MP countries, whether in the form of grants or European Investment Bank loans at low interest rates. As with later agreements, aid was the carrot used to entice MPs to agree to CAP-inspired import restrictions.

Third, social cooperation focused on pledges by the EC to improve the standard of living for immigrant workers living in Europe. These pledges included legalizing immigration of family members, and giving immigrants social rights equal to those of EC citizens. Most immigrant workers in Europe at the time were from Asia Minor or North Africa, and the rights and status of these workers were of great political significance in the countries of origin.

The goals of the GMP were broad and focused on economic issues, but nevertheless the initiative set the

tone for future agreements. With the addition to the European Community of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), and Spain and Portugal (1986), new incentives for the diversification of agricultural production were added to the GMP. The agreements were renewed twice in the 1980's without significant change. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership retained its focus on economic and social cooperation, with an underlying interest in security.

E. ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES

A series of initiatives aimed at promoting stability in the Mediterranean region followed the GMP. Notably, the Euro-Arab Dialogue began as a forum shared by the EC and the League of Arab States. The Dialogue as established in December 1973 in response to the October War (1973) between Israel and both Egypt and Syria. France led this initiative, but from the beginning the Euro-Arab Dialogue suffered from a divergence of goals between the two groups. Where the EC viewed the Dialogue as an economic cooperation forum, the League of Arab States saw it as a forum for discussing political affairs. Owing to this disagreement, the Dialogue was suspended in 1979, and three attempts to revive it have failed due to events in the Middle East, including the 1979 Camp David Accords, the 1979 expulsion

of Egypt from the League of Arab States (Egypt was reinstated in 1989), and the 1990-91 Gulf War.

Other initiatives designed to foster Mediterranean Cooperation have been equally disappointing. A proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Mediterranean Contact Group, and the Western European Union's Mediterranean Dialogue, among others, have little to show for their efforts. In most cases, the vexing problem of peace between Israel and its neighbors has scuttled initial optimism. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has nonetheless managed to evolve beyond its initial form and to continue to show promise in forming a more stable region.

F. THE RENOVATED MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

With the impending collapse of the Soviet empire within sight, the EC's focus had shifted by 1990. With bigger budgets available, the European Commission sought to redefine and focus its financial goals and strategies in the Mediterranean. The Global Mediterranean Policy was too broad and limited to form the basis for a truly regional partnership. Thus, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) was born.

The RMP included greater support for International Monetary Fund and World Bank protocols for MP countries, the promotion of small and medium-size businesses, and the encouragement of environmental protection. The RMP was more directly tasked with improving economic conditions within MPs, both to strengthen trading partners and to stabilize the region.

Additionally, the RMP included a human rights focus, with a stated but never enforced policy of freezing the assets of any government that violated the human rights of its citizens or others. The RMP also was aimed at bolstering civil society, including media, universities, and municipalities. Such independent sectors of society had been critical in the transformation of East Central Europe, and the RMP encouraged the same stabilizing effects in the Mediterranean. This declaratory encouragement was not, however, backed by specific actions.

Overall, the RMP was designed to speed up the social and economic development of the region, improving living conditions and fostering closer regional integration and cooperation. The implicit goals were to reduce tensions in the region, fight organized crime and terrorism, reduce immigration pressure, and control competition in the agricultural sector in particular. In short, the RMP was

the method by which the EC could better control the forces that were gaining momentum due to the demographic and economic disparity between north and south.

G. PARTNERSHIP

From the GMP to the RMP, the EC's policies had focused on control through engagement to deal with problems associated with its Mediterranean neighbors. However, as the process evolved, the emphasis had slowly changed. By 1992, the realities of a post-Cold War world, real prospects for peace, and a new awareness of the vitality of the south were spurring the EU toward a new concept: partnership.

III. THE BARCELONA DECLARATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the development and structure of the Barcelona Declaration, to examine the motivations behind the Barcelona Conference and to evaluate the broader goals of regional stability and prosperity.

B. THE BARCELONA CONFERENCE OF 1995

In November 1995, the Foreign Ministers of the fifteen EU countries met with their counterparts from twelve Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. With the exception of the PA, responsible for Gaza and much of the West Bank of the Jordan River, each of these countries already had signed a bilateral agreement with the European Union (or its predecessor, the European Community) under either the GMP or RMP.

But the Barcelona Declaration was to be different. Rather than simply reducing tariffs and agreeing on how to fight transnational crime, the Barcelona Declaration launched a formal process of partnership and integration. The centerpiece was the establishment of a Free Trade Area

by 2010, encompassing all 27 countries and rivaling the recently ratified North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in scope. The Declaration established protocols and working groups to generate Association Agreements and to develop the procedures that would draw the countries of the Mediterranean region into a more closely integrated economic unit.

C. MOTIVES AND ACTIONS

The EU itself, in describing its motives for pursuing the Barcelona Declaration, identified inadequacies in previous initiatives: "The EU is launching the Euro-Med partnership partly out of dissatisfaction with the results so far achieved by its Mediterranean policy."⁸ But some analysts, such as Etel Solingen of the University of California at Irvine, see the Barcelona Declaration as a reaction to the post-Cold War reshuffling of security priorities:

The Barcelona Process must be seen as a part of a broader scheme of European Union (EU) evolution in the post Cold War era, one involving spatial and functional expansion, including efforts to design a common foreign policy. Both classical security issues (the availability of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East, terrorism, oil and natural gas dependencies) and "new" security issues (drugs, migration, human rights violations, environmental degradation)

⁸ "Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership—the Barcelona Conference," Available [Online]: <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/euromed.html> [20 June 2000]

bear on EU concerns with the political fate of the Mediterranean basin.⁹

Such a reaction reflects an intellectual tradition for analyzing the Mediterranean that Ian Lesser describes as viewing the region as "Europe's near abroad."¹⁰ In this model, the Mediterranean is not a bridge but a barrier that must be maintained and strengthened in order to deal with potential threats. Lesser has offered a succinct assessment of the EU's motives in constructing the Barcelona Process: "With the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Europe has made an attempt to subsidize stability in the south."¹¹ The goal is stability for Europe even if the tool used is international partnership.

D. THE THREE PILLARS

Although short on specific directives, the Barcelona Declaration outlined the three institutional pillars for what was to become known as the Barcelona Process (BP). The pillars involve political and security matters, social and human affairs, and economic and financial partnerships.

⁹ Etel Solingen, "Constructing a Mediterranean Region: Cultural and Functional Perspectives," Available [Online]: http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/conference_papers/cmr_solingen.html [20 July 2000]

¹⁰ Ian Lesser, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: A Transatlantic Perspective," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassv.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwhless.html> [11 June 2000]. See also the statement by Chris Patten using the term "near abroad," Chapter I.

¹¹ Lesser, *ibid*.

First, the BP was to support a political and security partnership in order to establish a common area of peace and stability. The Declaration specifically emphasized human rights and dignity as well as regional security, and called for diplomatic cooperation and a commitment to resolving disputes peacefully. Most importantly, the signatories agreed to a further commitment to work together to eliminate transnational threats such as terrorism and international crime.

The second pillar of the Declaration is a partnership in social, cultural, and human affairs. The heart of this effort is the promotion of exchanges to increase mutual understanding. The areas of concentration are municipalities, media, civil societies, youth, social development (including health care), and law enforcement (to combat terrorism and international crime). Along with the two other pillars, the social development pillar of the Barcelona Process represents a comprehensive, ambitious, and forward thinking effort to deal with Mediterranean issues. Although it may be optimistic as well, it includes provisions to reassess goals and revise targets. At each "Barcelona" meeting, the progress of the initiative can be judged.

The cornerstone for the BP, however, is the development of a true economic and financial partnership. The declaration calls for "a common area of peace and stability," and this goal is the continuation of the process begun with the Global Mediterranean Policy. Included in the economic initiative are efforts regarding debt relief, improved living conditions, and a substantial increase in the EU's financial assistance to MPs. But the most important initiative by far is the previously mentioned goal of a Free Trade Area by 2010.

The Free Trade Area is to be established through bilateral agreements, with the interim step of sub-regional Free Trade Areas. The target date has been set for 2010 for gradual establishment of the FTA covering "most" trade. Clearly, there was much to negotiate. For example, tariff elimination in the FTA is planned for agricultural products, but only as far as current internal policies allow. Such restrictions will be difficult to overcome, but that task will be simpler to accomplish than the last provision: cooperation and concerted action. The subjects that will take the most work to bring the regions in line with each other are in the areas of certification, quality control, property rights, market economies, and modernization of economic and social structures.

E. THE LOGIC BEHIND THE PROCESS

Etel Solingen, a professor at the University of California at Irvine, places these initiatives into three categories, and outlines the logic behind each. First, economic reform is necessary to replace "the bankruptcy of decades-old Middle East/North Africa political-economy models"¹² that have led to a region marked by high infant mortality, rampant illiteracy, debilitating unemployment, tremendous income disparity, and the lowest level of food self-sufficiency in the world. All this economic backwardness was adjacent to the EU, and the EU had to deal with it. The European Union's leaders decided that it would be wiser to guide the process than to hope that the situation would be resolved without the EU's help, an unlikely prospect.

Second, Solingen describes the social and human affairs pillar as the means to establish democracy:

In the European experience, stable and mature democracies are considered to be better suited to deal with ethnic and religious fragmentation than non-democracies...In this view, only democracy can be expected to guarantee human rights and personal freedoms. "Good governance" cannot emanate from regimes that are not accountable.¹³

This pillar was designed to foster good governance. The promotion of civil society, as a key element of democracy,

was thus included in the Barcelona Process with the goal of establishing more accountable regimes and thus promoting a democratic peace throughout the region.

Third, Solingen claims that the political and security pillar of the Barcelona Declaration promotes regional multilateralism according to the model of the EU itself: "If it worked in Europe, why not everywhere?"¹⁴ This effort was designed to deal with the classical and new security issues, but also implicitly with the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The United States had for at least two decades taken the lead in the MEPP, but the Barcelona Process was the EU's attempt to take a greater role.

F. LINKAGE TO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The linkage with the MEPP presents problems, as noted by George Joffé:

The simple fact is that the Barcelona Process not only served long-standing European Union objectives which stemmed from European anxieties over potential security threats from the south Mediterranean as well as from the need to overhaul the Union's south Mediterranean policy. It also formed part of the complex pattern of interlocking processes and agreements by which Middle East peace was supposed to be achieved.¹⁵

¹² Solingen, *ibid.*

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ George Joffé, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona", Available [Online]: <http://www.riia.org/briefingpapers/bp44.html> [10 June 2000]

The assumption that United States and EU interests in the Mediterranean coincide was not held by all EU member states, and as a result "it was decided that the United States should not even have observer status at the Barcelona Conference."¹⁶ The exclusion did not play well in Washington, and the US government reacted by ignoring the Barcelona Process altogether in its MEPP strategy.

The Barcelona Declaration produced a process that would need much fine tuning, but nevertheless with concrete and ambitious goals. However, the exclusion of the United States from this EU-centered initiative produced an inherent problem. While insisting that the MEPP be part of the Barcelona Process, the EU separated the BP from the key power brokering peace in the Middle East. The progress of the EU's Barcelona Process would thus be tied to a process it did not directly control, one in which its influence would be far less than that of the United States.

Further, by approaching the Mediterranean as a region and attempting to improve Arab-Israeli relations outside the US-led MEPP, the BP attempted to create stability without effectively participating in the political focus of the region. Nabil Sha'ath of the Palestinian Authority considers this an inherent problem with the initiative:

¹⁶ Joffé, *ibid.*

The Barcelona Process is really a global process and it is European in its approach, strategic in its nature, comprehensive in its content, and most of all it attempted not to be Israeli-centric. But of course it is very difficult to make any regional approach succeed without tackling that problem.¹⁷

The problem of the MEPP is embedded in the region and could not be avoided by the Barcelona Process. The question of Arab-Israeli relations would be a recurring impediment to the achievement of the stated goals of the Barcelona Declaration as it moved from the pages of a document to practical implementation.

¹⁷ Nabil Sha'ath, Untitled Speech, The Conference of Europe and Palestine, 1-3 October 1998, Available [Online]: http://www.pna.net/speeches/nabil_sha'ath.htm [20 July 2000]

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the Barcelona Declaration, several meetings have been held to further refine the initiative and construct a framework for the implementation of more specific goals. However, ongoing difficulties with the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and Mediterranean Partner (MP) questions about EU motives have raised questions about how effective the Barcelona Process can be in such an unbalanced relationship.

B. BARCELONA II

In June 1997, the Second Barcelona Conference was held, this time in Malta. The 27 foreign ministers representing the 1995 Barcelona Declaration signatories met to check their progress, and the original document was strongly reaffirmed. The focus began to shift, however, from the general, sweeping issues discussed in Barcelona to much more specific practical questions. In Malta, working group sessions took the place of plenary discussions.

However, little progress had been made on the economic front. Harmonization of economic systems of such differing levels of productivity and efficiency was perhaps the

greatest challenge, and represented the most significant difficulty in establishing a Free Trade Area.

Events outside the purview of the Barcelona Process were causing problems as well. The MEPP had bogged down, and by 1997 tensions were again rising between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The simmering conflict slowed the rapid progress in BP working groups, and prompted a slowdown in movement toward further cooperation.

At the Palermo Informal Meeting in 1998, milestones such as a Customs Union with Turkey and further EU Association Agreements with Israel, the PA, Morocco, Turkey, and Jordan could be celebrated. However, these accomplishments were muted by stalled negotiations with Egypt. Difficulties with the MEPP continued to cast a shadow over the BP and to limit progress toward further integration.

C. BARCELONA III

In April 1999, the follow-on conference called Barcelona III was held in Stuttgart, Germany. The EU placed heavy emphasis on the MEPP in the hope that it could be put aside in the BP negotiations. The conference affirmed that the Barcelona Process was a complement to the Oslo Accords (September 1993) and the Wye River Memorandum (October 1998) in furthering improved relations between

Israel and the Palestinian Authority. All three initiatives work toward reconciling Israelis and Palestinians to end the ongoing conflict in the eastern Mediterranean.

As progress was made with the MEPP, Barcelona III further refined the economic plank of the process. Specifically, south-south sub-regional Free Trade Areas (FTAs) were reaffirmed as the next step towards the eventual regional FTA. The EU also emphasized the difficult task of standardizing details such as customs cooperation, free movement of goods, public procurement, certification of standards, intellectual property rights, taxation, data protection, competition rules, and accounting and auditing procedures. These areas had to be worked out for an FTA to have any chance of formation.

In general, Barcelona III addressed all issues more specifically, and emphasized the importance of decentralized engagement between nations and citizens as well as meetings of foreign ministers. Financial support to the Mediterranean region has dramatically increased, and has begun to keep pace with aid to Eastern Europe. Notable as well was the inclusion of a Libyan delegation as observers at German insistence and despite continuing U.N. sanctions against Tripoli.

D. OBSTACLES AND OBJECTIONS

The centerpiece of the Barcelona Process remains the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area. However, from the BP's inception, analysts pointed out one major obstacle to a true FTA. The EU's use of bilateral agreements with MPs created a system with the EU in the center and MPs linked only to the EU and not each other:

The SMR [southern Mediterranean region] countries can expect to benefit from the positive credibility effect associated with being "locked into" a liberalization schedule with a major regional trade grouping. This will help foster a more favorable investment climate that will encourage further domestic and foreign direct investment. However, a cost to the region could arise from the so-called "hubspoke" effect, resulting from the establishment of a free-trade agreement with the EU while each SMR country maintains high intraregional trade barriers.¹⁸

This analysis highlights not just a flaw in the BP's structure, but hints at a deeper problem in concept and motivation. Despite the Barcelona Declaration's lofty goals, MP critics have argued, from the beginning the EU has evidently intended to be the primary winner through an initiative designed to safeguard European interests above all.

Some measure of accomplishment can nonetheless be recorded for the BP. Cultural exchanges have been a

¹⁸ Salem M. Nasaouli, Amer Bisat, and Oussama Kanaan, "The European Union's New Mediterranean Strategy," *Finance and Development*, September 1996, pp. 14-17.

success, although it must be acknowledged that such initiatives are limited in scope and relatively inexpensive. Association agreements are signed or nearing signature for all partners. At a minimum, efforts toward production quality standardization, combined with nearly 10 billion euros in cumulative direct aid and loans, are helping to modernize the economies of the MP's.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the report card for the BP is mixed at best. In fact, the Malta and Palermo meetings came up short in their central goal: constructing a more defined security charter for the Euro-Mediterranean region. Stephen Calleya describes the inherent flaw in the Malta Declaration:

The vagueness [of the Declaration] is a clear indication of the lack of progress that has been achieved in conceptualizing a framework for setting up a pan-Euro-Mediterranean security agreement. The partner countries failed to commit themselves to an incremental work program that would at least seek to create the necessary cooperative relations that would allow for the introduction of such a charter.²⁰

Further, specific timetables for achieving such a framework have been avoided.²¹ Clearly, barriers still exist to

¹⁹ Chris Patten, "The European Union's external policy and the Mediterranean: the case for Israel," Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_134.htm [3 June 2000]

²⁰ Stephen Calleya, "Regional Security Challenges in the Mediterranean," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p.103

²¹ Calleya, *ibid.* To end the impasse, Calleya recommends focusing on confidence building measures in order to break down North-South distrust. These include government, business, and educational exchanges.

moving the BP beyond rhetoric and producing tangible benefits.

E. THE CULTURAL DIVIDE

Why has the BP not moved more quickly toward real progress? Certainly, the lack of more clearly defined goals is a symptom of a problem; but, as Calleya suggests, the distrust is too deep to be resolved with the Barcelona Declaration.

Of course, the concept behind the BP has its origins in the formation of the European Union and the EU's approach to the formerly Communist states of Eastern Europe. Etel Solingen sums up the attitude of the Barcelona Declaration's signatories as follows: "If it worked in Europe, why not everywhere?"²² Roberto Aliboni of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome elaborates:

The Barcelona Declaration principles and aims are largely inspired by the model of cooperation and integration of the EU itself....Strongly influenced by [the] EU's experience in dealing with post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe, the Barcelona Declaration puts forward a systemic interplay among democracy, integration, and peace as the basic ingredients to affect root causes of instability.²³

Such principles and aims are consistent with the view that the EU's motives for pursuing the BP are closely linked

²² Solingen, *ibid.*

with the Barcelona Declaration's stated goals of peace, stability, prosperity, and mutual understanding.

However, at least one key ingredient is missing from the EMP that has helped to propel the EU toward its current state of integration: a common culture. While the EU aspires to represent a "European" constituency of peoples, no such link exists with Mediterranean Partners. As exemplified by the EU's rejection of Morocco's application for membership in July 1987,²⁴ status as a Mediterranean Partner does not imply true eligibility for future EU membership.²⁵ This inherent discrimination among countries casts doubt on the view that the EU has been motivated by its own example to deepen cooperation with its neighbors.

The cultural divide thus in evidence limits the BP from the onset, and defines Mediterranean cooperation in terms differing from EU expansion to Central Europe:

The big difference is that the Mediterranean countries are neighbors as opposed to family. Why do I say this? Because the Mediterranean countries of North Africa are not eligible for membership of the European Union. It's worth repeating it, because Morocco once applied to

²³ Roberto Alboni, "European Union Security Perceptions and Policies Towards the Mediterranean," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 133.

²⁴ Technically, the Council of Ministers did not accede to an application from Morocco on 20 July 1987. Morocco's application was never even considered.

²⁵ Such a promise was not made in the Barcelona Declaration, and there is no evidence that EU membership was in the offing. However, certain MP countries considered at least somewhat "European" by the EU are exceptions to this exclusion. These include Malta and Cyprus, and possibly (and still controversially) Turkey.

join and was politely told, sorry you're not eligible.²⁶

If this is the case, any parallel drawn between the EU's formation and the Barcelona Process must be called into question. Although both arose ostensibly to promote peace and stability, the BP must be limited by its nature as an agreement between nations with little in common save geography.

F. INSTABILITY AND THE MEPP

More pressing are questions about the actual effects of the Barcelona Process as opposed to the ideals. Ian Lesser has offered a blunt and critical assessment:

It seems to me a fair question to ask whether the sorts of reforms that are being encouraged in the southern Mediterranean states are the kind that are really going to promote stability over the long term. Perhaps they will. But they clearly also introduce tensions in the south in societies that already face a lot of different social and political and economic challenges.²⁷

Not the least of these tensions is what Lesser calls the security of identity. With or without further integration, the flow of information both ways across the Mediterranean leads to a perception of cultural threat. In Lesser's words: "When Islamists in Algeria talk about the effect of satellite television, they talk about not 'disc

²⁶ Fraser Cameron, "The European Union and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwcamr.html> [11 June 2000]

parabolique, but disc diabolique.'" ²⁸ The cultural divide such a statement represents is real and fully understood in the region. As such, it remains a major barrier to effective cooperation.

Regardless of the obstacles, European dependence on Middle East petroleum dictates an increasing EU interest in promoting regional stability. ²⁹ The proponents of the Barcelona Process hold that the key to such stability is economic development, and that with the weakness or collapse of other Mediterranean initiatives, only the Barcelona Process offers a genuine chance for progress. As George Joffé, Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, states:

The Barcelona Process is the only remaining vehicle through which economic development of the south Mediterranean region – agreed by all to be the essential component of whatever regional peace and security structure eventually emerges there – can be achieved. ³⁰

From this perspective, the BP is less about creating an EU-like integrated region than about keeping peace (through economic cooperation) on Europe's southern border. Since one of the major impediments to progress for the Barcelona

²⁷ Ian Lesser, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: A Transatlantic Perspective," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwhless.html> [20 July 2000]

²⁸ Lesser, *ibid.*

²⁹ George Joffé, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two years After Barcelona," Available [Online]: <http://www.riia.org/briefingpaper/bp44.html> [10 June 2000]

³⁰ Joffé, *ibid.*

Process is the continued floundering of the U.S.-led MEPP, the EU has not been able to reap the benefits of its initiative with its Mediterranean Partners.

The United States has recognized the importance of the Barcelona Process in economic, political, social, and security terms; and Washington has at least since 1997 indicated support for the initiative. The EU has nevertheless grown impatient with a perceived American bias in favor of Israel that is perceived to undermine the MEPP, at least in the eyes of many in Europe.³¹ Because the EU has not as yet developed the common institutions to enter into the MEPP and effectively conduct diplomacy as a Union with a single voice, it does not actively participate. As George Joffé states, "The Barcelona Process cannot, therefore, exploit the strategic environment in which it finds itself today."³²

G. THE ECONOMIC FACTOR

Another indication of the EU's motivation in proposing the BP is the critically important economic initiative. The central feature of this initiative was to expand the EU's traditional bilateral economic agreements with MPs to develop bilateral free trade areas between the EU and

³¹ Joffé, *ibid.* Joffé points out that for Europe, the Middle East is an explosive region on its periphery, not the distant trouble spot as seen by Americans.

³² Joffé, *ibid.*

individual MPs. One difference from past agreements was crucial: tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers would be removed by the MPs, not the EU. The idea was to stimulate MP economies through unfettered competition with EU economies.³³ Aid by the EU to the region was increased by 25 percent, with loans and grants directed primarily to the private sector.

However, these agreements fell short of creating true free trade areas:

Quite apart from the fact that the proposed agreements excluded services and agricultural produce—in order to protect the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (one of the fiercest defenders being Spain, also the fiercest protagonist of the Barcelona Process!)—they also prevented free movement of people because of European anxiety over migration. All in all, therefore, the proposed new agreements were hardly as generous or as optimistic as the preamble of the Barcelona Declaration suggested.³⁴

Understandably, the MPs were "not impressed by the [European] Union's commitment to the new policy so far."³⁵ Of particular concern was the perception that the MPs were to bear the burden for the BP while the EU would reap the benefits. This highlights the most serious impediment to the development of the BP: structural problems in the initiative itself. Bolstering this argument is the glaring

³³ George Joffé points out that such an arrangement would cause considerable economic pain for the MPs. In view of this circumstance, a 12-year transition period was incorporated into the agreements.

³⁴ Joffé, *ibid*.

fact that the agreements favored the EU in areas of comparative advantage:

Access to the European market in areas where they could usefully compete, such as agriculture, are closed to them while they must accept the full force of European industry without investment to be able to respond by penetrating into Europe itself.³⁶

Such policies have frustrated MPs, but as George Joffé states: "It is interesting to note that, despite those disadvantages and others, every country in the Mediterranean has sought to sign up to these agreements."³⁷ Clearly, the carrot of financing, grants, and loans through the EU's Mesures d'Ajustement (MEDA) program as well as the promise of greater access to European markets in the future has been enough to draw MPs into the BP.

Even so, objections remain. MPs have concerns about economic policies (Standards and Specification, Rules of Origin, Intellectual Property rights, and Competition Policy)³⁸ that favor the EU as well as the negative effects on social stability and MP industries that current BP policies would generate. MPs insist that they have received insufficient EU aid, especially compared to the

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ George Joffé, "Economic Security in the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwhjofe.html> [10 June 2000]

aid sent to Eastern Europe.³⁹ This comparison to Eastern Europe prompted the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, to emphatically state in April 2000 that the EU is committed to both regions: "The development of one dimension need not be at the expense of the other."⁴⁰

Arab MPs further resented the EU's unwillingness to deal directly with the MEPP through the BP. By not specifically addressing the reported possession of nuclear weapons by Israel while pushing for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region, the EU exacerbated Arab frustration: "In fact, there is a strong feeling among Arabs that the EU is giving Israel preferential political and economic treatment that it is not willing to extend to the Arabs."⁴¹ The establishment of the European Force (EUROFOR) and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) by four Mediterranean EU countries, without MP participation or consultation, did nothing to develop trust in the EU's motives in the region.⁴²

In conjunction with these sources of mistrust of the EU and also as a consequence of economic or social

³⁸ Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, "Arab Perceptions of the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Projects," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millennium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 143.

³⁹ El-Sayed Selim, *ibid.* Here again is a case in which MPs believe they should be on an equal footing with non-EU Europeans.

⁴⁰ Patten, *ibid.* Commissioner Patten spoke these same words to separate audiences in both Egypt and Israel in March/April 2000.

⁴¹ El-Sayed Selim, *ibid.*

frustration, many in MP countries strongly reject the influence of the EU, seeing it as a form of neo-colonialism. Pervasive evidence of xenophobia within Europe, including violence directed at workers from MP countries, does little to develop trust and respect. Such perceptions undermine the Barcelona Process itself:

Official European attempts to demonstrate cultural respect ring hollow when contrasted with the everyday reality of cultural contempt and indifference. It is, perhaps, an inevitable consequence of globalization and universal communications but it, more than any other factor, threatens the successful outcome of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative.⁴³

Drawn by the potential benefits of association with the EU and having few other viable options, MPs have remained with the BP despite their misgivings. However, objections to closer ties between the EU and countries of the southern Mediterranean are not limited to MPs. Within the EU itself, a regional split exists as well, and may threaten further progress and the level of EU commitment to the Barcelona Process.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Joffé, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona," *ibid.*

V. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the split between northern and southern EU countries in their approach to Mediterranean issues. The Barcelona Process was initiated by the EU's southern tier, led by France and Spain; and it has been a much lower priority for the countries of the north. Germany and Great Britain have put greater emphasis on relations with the countries of the former Soviet-dominated bloc, and prospects for the success of the Barcelona Process must be examined in light of this difference in priorities.

B. NO CAUSE FOR ALARM

The Barcelona Process is predicated on a unified EU working with twelve different MPs. The need for the EU to present a united front and be seen as genuinely committed to the BP cannot be overstated, particularly in light of the distrust of EU motives described in Chapter IV. The importance of this issue prompted Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, to emphatically assert to separate Israeli and Egyptian audiences in April 2000 that the EU's interests in central and eastern Europe did not preclude a strong commitment to the Barcelona Process. He spoke of "dispelling a particularly widespread

misunderstanding,"⁴⁴ referring to the commonly held belief that the EU's priority is expansion to the east, relegating the Mediterranean region to second class status.

This reassurance to Mediterranean Partners is echoed in the analysis of the RAND Corporation's Ian Lesser:

I think if we were looking at this issue 10 years ago, even five years ago there was a very striking difference between perspectives in Southern Europe and perspectives in Germany, the U.K. and even to a certain degree in France. Mediterranean Security was something that southern Europeans talked about and pushed in various fora for obvious geopolitical reasons but also because it was a vehicle for being more active and Southern Europe was looking to be more active.⁴⁵

Now, Lesser explains, countries like Germany find that as they become more actively engaged in political affairs outside their own borders (especially in their immediate proximity), they must deal with the countries of the Mediterranean region. In Germany's case, internal problems with a large ethnic Turkish population initially invited as guest workers have necessitated a reconsideration of Berlin's relations with Turkey. Due to such ties and concerns, northern European countries will be more engaged with the BP because they are more engaged with Mediterranean issues.

⁴⁴ Chris Patten, "The European Union's External Policy and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.it/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_116.htm (3 June 2000)

To reinforce this point, the issue of German preoccupation with the east is addressed in the context of the illegal immigration, transnational crime, and Islamic fundamentalist threats from the south: "It would be wrong, a German official suggested, to see these threats solely as southern European concerns. Germany wants to extend stability both to the East and to the South."⁴⁶ The message is clear. The Mediterranean may have once been mainly a southern European concern, but it is now a concern of all EU member nations.

There is some evidence that this shift has happened. Richard Gillespie of the University of Portsmouth acknowledges "something of a 'tendency in northern Europe to see Mediterranean co-operation as an unnecessary luxury.'"⁴⁷ However, he notes that the "'export' to Europe of north African problems and their consequences...together with policy trade-offs within the EU, account for the recent growth in northern interest in the Mediterranean."⁴⁸ To Gillespie, Lesser, and Patten, northern Europe is firmly, albeit somewhat recently, on board with the BP.

⁴⁵ Ian Lesser, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: A Transatlantic Perspective," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwhless.html> [20 July 2000]

⁴⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee and Carla Thorson, *Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges, Conference Proceedings, Brussels, October 15-17, 1995*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), p. 12.

⁴⁷ Richard Gillespie, Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process, Available [Online]: <http://www.cidob.es/Castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.html> [21 June 2000]

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

The question arises, however, of why so much attention is placed on reassuring everyone involved that the northern European countries of the EU are committed to Mediterranean cooperation. Why the insistence?

C. THE SOUTH

What is not in dispute is that the southern European EU countries were the driving force behind the BP at the outset. The military and non-military threats posed by an unstable Mediterranean region are obviously felt most strongly by the EU countries bordering the region. Italy has long promoted closer ties to its Arab neighbors across the sea, and France maintains deep-seated ties to its former colonies in the Maghreb despite the violence that ended colonial rule. Spain took the lead by hosting the Barcelona conference, which took place during the Spanish presidency of the EU. Spain in particular has emphasized the need for a common EU external affairs policy to promote Mediterranean stability.⁴⁹

Italy's interests are split. Italians are ambivalent about their Mediterranean identity:

"France and Germany see Italy as a Mediterranean country," says Luca Corracido, editor of *Limes*, an influential Italian quarterly. "We are there

⁴⁹ Andrew J. Richards, "Spain: From Isolation to Integration," in Ronald Tiersky, ed., *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 190. Richards, of the Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones in Madrid, emphasizes Spanish ties to the Arab League, which facilitated the formation of the Barcelona Conference.

geographically, but see ourselves first as westerners, second as Europeans, third as Mediterraneans."⁵⁰

Nonetheless, Italy is particularly vulnerable to threats from the south and Italian governments have long pursued friendlier relations with Arab nations. As Rodolfo Ragionieri observes: "Another factor making a difference in Italian foreign political and economic relations has been Libya."⁵¹ Italy has had no compunctions about dealing directly with Libya, despite American misgivings.⁵² Italy has seen the potential threat from the south and has taken steps to develop ties that will, it is hoped, lessen the danger.

France is unique in being both a northern and southern European country, but it is firmly committed to the Mediterranean:

France is the only European state which has an ambition to play openly the role of a global medium-sized power. This is especially true as far as Arab, and generally speaking, Mediterranean countries are concerned.⁵³

The legacy of France's Algerian involvement, its relations with Iraq, and its pursuit of a more active role in the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians are

⁵⁰ John Newhouse, *Europe Adrift* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), p. 276.

⁵¹ Rodolfo Ragionieri, "Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 423.

⁵² *ibid.*, p. 423.

⁵³ *ibid.*, p. 423.

manifestations of this ambition, as is the Barcelona Process itself.

Of the "motors of the Barcelona Process,"⁵⁴ Spain "plays a larger role in the Western Mediterranean, larger probably than France."⁵⁵ Spain has long pushed the EU to adopt a more structured Mediterranean policy, and took the lead in 1995 to "implement a European [Union] framework for the Mediterranean."⁵⁶ Reflecting Spain's growing post-Franco confidence, the new Mediterranean initiatives were of vital importance to the nation, which is among the EU countries most affected by instability to the south. As such, "Spain used its presidency of the European Union to once again press its Mediterranean agenda,"⁵⁷ culminating in the Barcelona Conference of 1995.

So France, Italy, and Spain (or "Club Med"⁵⁸) led the way to the Barcelona Declaration for the obvious reason that they stood to lose the most from disorders in the southern Mediterranean. Among them, "Spain has undoubtedly played the major role in persuading the EU that the problems of North Africa are European, and not merely

⁵⁴ Gillespie, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Newhouse, *ibid.*, p. 276.

⁵⁶ Ragionieri, *ibid.*, p. 426.

⁵⁷ Richards, *ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵⁸ Newhouse, *ibid.*, p. 94. This label has been given to the Mediterranean EU countries by journalists and politicians of the EU's northern tier to imply both a carefree attitude and a commonality of interests among the southern tier countries.

southern European problems."⁵⁹ But how committed are the countries of the EU's northern tier to the EMP? Do Germany, Britain, and the others have higher priorities elsewhere?

D. THE NORTH

The northern European countries are not easy to define as a bloc, as Gillespie acknowledges: "They have differing levels of interest, and different interests, in the Mediterranean and by no means always agree on what should be done there."⁶⁰ However, he concludes that "so long as the appropriate qualifications are made, it is legitimate to focus on northern (or southern) European countries collectively when considering the prospects of the Barcelona process."⁶¹

Further, Gillespie adds that "there have been clear north-south differences"⁶² in EU support for North Africa. George Joffé describes the heart of these differences as follows:

The southern European countries became aware that, with the end of the Cold War, European attention, dominated by Britain and Germany, would be directed eastwards. The process of integrating what had formerly been Eastern Europe into the European Union - and that became the objective very early on - would be one that would

⁵⁹ Gillespie, *ibid.*

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² *ibid.*

redirect funds inside Europe away from the South of the continent, which had been the impoverished part of the Union before. Thus, southern European countries had an acute interest in redefining the economic agenda in Europe by emphasizing the dangers of the Mediterranean.⁶³

Since the end of the Cold War, the northern EU countries have looked east and the southern EU countries have looked south.

The British, despite their long-standing ties to the Mediterranean, were apt to focus attention on the former Soviet bloc for two reasons. First, Britain endorsed United States efforts to stabilize East Central Europe as a priority for NATO, and thus were more willing to back German efforts in that regard. Second, strong ties to Washington led the British to shy away from any action that could jeopardize the American-led MEPP.⁶⁴ In both respects, the British focus was greatly affected by the importance of the Atlantic Alliance.

Germany's situation was much more complex. In dealing with the Middle East generally, Germany carried the burden of history:

The German approach to the Middle East and to the relation with Arab countries has been determined since the foundation of the republic by different and sometimes conflicting factors.⁶⁵

⁶³ George Joffé, "Economic Security in the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwhjofe.html> [10 June 2000]

⁶⁴ Ragionieri, *ibid.*, p. 426.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 427.

On the one hand, Germany was dependent on Arab countries for part of its energy supply and had historically maintained strong ties in the Arab world. However, Holocaust guilt dictated a very delicate approach to Arab-Israeli relations. Moreover, in view of the ever-present problems associated with a substantial Turkish guest worker population within Germany (initially invited for a limited duration only), the Federal Republic of Germany was impelled to tread lightly with Mediterranean issues.

Regardless of its stance on Mediterranean issues, German focus was definitely to the east: "Germans by and large know what they want - to be in the center of Europe, not on the frontier of the EU."⁶⁶ John Newhouse explains the meaning of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's effort to expand the EU to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland:

He is reflecting a sentiment, shared in Washington, that the EU members and the United States must extend the zone of stability and prosperity in western Europe. Starting with countries in east-central Europe that are politically and economically compatible.⁶⁷

The priority is clearly given to stability and prosperity in Europe, not elsewhere. Therefore, EU

⁶⁶ Newhouse, *ibid.*, p. 107.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p. 108.

expansion to the east was a priority for Germany, but not so for the EU's southern tier:

A senior Italian official, commenting acidly on the last enlargement cycle, said "The EU Commission now resembles Amnesty International, with Swedes and Finns joining the other moralists, the Dutch and the Danes." He expressed support for NATO enlargement because it would recommit the United States to European security. But on EU enlargement, he was as negative as most of his counterparts in the EU's southern tier.⁶⁸

Such opposition to EU expansion was not solely due to the diminished importance of Mediterranean concerns, of course. Budgets generally and the Common Agricultural Policy in particular fueled opponents, and EU expansion was put on hold. The north-south split was nonetheless evident.

E. PRESSURE TO SUPPORT THE EMP

To produce the Barcelona Declaration, the southern tier, led by Spain, used the northern tier's focus on the east as leverage: "Felipé Gonzalez had threatened to block progress towards the eastern enlargement of the EU unless a semblance of balance between east and south was introduced into the EU's external relations."⁶⁹ The pressure worked, in that the Barcelona Process was launched; but it did not bring the north and the south together in their views on how to approach support for North Africa. Southern

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p. 295.

⁶⁹ Gillespie, *ibid.*

Europeans stressed the need for financial support, knowing that this would come mainly from the north. Northern Europeans stressed the importance of market access, knowing that the farmers of south Europe would face the most direct competition from North Africa.⁷⁰ The resulting aid/trade polarity continues unresolved, and exemplifies the fundamental difference between the north and the south.

Despite the strong emphasis in the Barcelona Declaration on the mutual benefits of economic cooperation for both the EU and the MPs, "neither in northern nor in southern Europe is there any real evidence of economic gain having been an important stimulus or consideration behind the Euro-Mediterranean project."⁷¹ Compared to its economic stake in other areas of the world, the Mediterranean is relatively unimportant economically to the EU. This is especially true of the northern tier: "German, British, and Scandinavian priorities continued to relate to central and eastern Europe."⁷² The north went along with the EMP, but was in reality much more interested in the east.

Further, it is clear that the Barcelona Declaration was a concession by the northern Europeans to the southern

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ *ibid.*

⁷² *ibid.*

Europeans. The north's agreement to support the BP was lukewarm at best:

Northern European states endorsed the Euro-Mediterranean initiative with some doubts regarding its viability and, although somewhat unsure where it would lead, were convinced at least that the EU needed to take concerted action in relation to a peripheral area containing threats to the stability of Europe.⁷³

Not surprisingly, the southern European countries have been disappointed with the tepid northern support; and Italy, France, and Spain have revived their pre-Barcelona lobby to keep the EMP an EU priority.⁷⁴ But the continued preoccupation of the northern tier with the former Soviet bloc as well as the north's lack of a strong commitment to the BP make Chris Patten's reassurances sound somewhat hollow. In George Joffé's analysis, both Germany and Britain "have failed lamentably to recognize the significance of the Mediterranean."⁷⁵

F. THE DIVIDE'S IMPACT ON THE EMP

The EU's north-south split on the issue of external relations priorities is no small threat to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Mediterranean Partners are doubtful about EU intentions as it is, and the EU's long-term commitment to the Barcelona Process may be called into

⁷³ *ibid.*

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁵ Joffé, *ibid.*

question by the north-south split. As George Joffé observes:

Europe is not cohesive. The Barcelona Process itself stands in grave danger because Northern European states do not believe in it. That is really serious if Britain and Germany, and to a lesser degree even France, are not going to be prepared to make any sort of imaginative decisions necessary for the process to continue effectively, even in the present form.⁷⁶

The extent to which the north-south split can be resolved will determine the viability of the Barcelona Process. However, the split is just one of the major difficulties confronting the EMP. In Chapter IV, the objections of the MPs to the BP are discussed, and the EU's motivations for pursuing the EMP are appraised. In Chapter VI, the Barcelona Process is assessed from the standpoint of the rivalry between the EU and its most important political and economic partner, the United States of America.

⁷⁶ Joffé, *ibid.*

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. NATO, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE EU

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the differing priorities of NATO, the United States, and the European Union in the Mediterranean and how those priorities interrelate. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative is examined, and the issue of United States-European Union cooperation and competition in the region is analyzed.

B. NATO AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

From 1949 to the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991, NATO's focus was containing the Soviet empire and being prepared to defend western Europe. Even so, as early as the 1960s a NATO Mediterranean-Middle East-Maghreb issue group was formed to study the region. The issues group met regularly into the 1990s, but its modest mission, relatively low priority, and lack of policy generation led southern European NATO members to push for a more robust effort. The changing security situation and post-Cold War concerns of southern European allies about NATO's emphasis on the east (to the neglect of the south) prompted this call as well.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Candy Green, "Enhancing NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwhgren.html> [20 August 2000]

C. THE NATO MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVE

By December 1994, nearly a year before the EU's Barcelona Conference, the North Atlantic Council formally initiated the NATO Mediterranean Initiative, authorizing case-by-case contacts with selected non-member countries in the Mediterranean region.⁷⁸ In February 1995, five countries were invited to participate: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Jordan was invited to join in November 1995, bringing the number of non-NATO Mediterranean participants to the current six.

From the beginning, the NATO Mediterranean Initiative was 16 plus 1, or a bilateral arrangement between NATO and each participating non-member country. Although multi-lateral meetings were possible and proposed, they were not part of the initiative as a rule. The NATO Mediterranean Initiative was built around exchanges between military and scientific communities, and designed specifically to promote confidence building and closer ties between people and organizations in NATO and countries participating in the initiative. With the establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group in 1997, a new feature was

⁷⁸ Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 1 December 1994, Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm> [11 November 2000]

added to the NATO Mediterranean Initiative for the discussion of security issues.⁷⁹

NATO has become more involved in the Mediterranean at the prompting of its southern European members for many of the same reasons the EU has pursued the Barcelona Process. As Mario Zucconi states: "Many analysts agree that if NATO is going to have a fight again in the near future, it will be in the Mediterranean region."⁸⁰ As NATO's answer to this potential for conflict, the NATO Mediterranean Initiative is quite modest. But in establishing a bilateral framework to foster cooperation and trust, NATO is attempting to reshape how participating countries of the southern Mediterranean view the Atlantic Alliance and address head-on the problems posed by the complex circumstances of the Mediterranean region. In late 1997, Javier Solana, the Spaniard then serving as NATO's Secretary-General, offered the following explanation:

To simply shield ourselves from the complexities of the South would deprive us of the opportunities to exert a positive influence on them. To see the Mediterranean as no more than the sum of its problems would ultimately become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The political

⁷⁹ Javier Solana, speech of 10 November 1997, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Fall 1997, Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971110a.htm> [20 August 2000]

⁸⁰ Mario Zucconi, "NATO in the Mediterranean," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), pp. 115-116.

evolution of this region can and should be steered in a positive direction.⁸¹

D. NATO'S PURPOSES AND PROBLEMS

The underlying purpose of the NATO Mediterranean Initiative, however, is more basic. Solana states this clearly:

The Mediterranean Initiative is first and foremost political. Through the establishment of a dialogue and regular exchanges of information, we can help dispel any misunderstandings or misconceptions that may have arisen over the activities of NATO.⁸²

In addressing "misunderstandings," NATO is dealing with its significant image problem around the Mediterranean.⁸³ NATO is still seen as a Cold War institution, but without a Cold War to justify its existence. Many countries in North Africa and the Middle East are skeptical of NATO and its motives:

With the exception of Israel, these countries endured years of Western colonialism and remain deeply suspicious of the West. Many see NATO primarily as an instrument for possible Western military intervention and dominance. They fear that NATO is looking for a new enemy to legitimate itself in the post-Cold War period and that [Islamic] fundamentalism may become that enemy.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Javier Solana, "NATO and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://users.erols.com/mqmq/solana.htm> [14 July 2000]

⁸² Solana, speech of 10 Nov 1997, *ibid*.

⁸³ Green, *ibid*.

⁸⁴ Ronald Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian Lesser, "Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks," Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-6.htm> [14 July 2000]

This distrust is a pervasive theme when analysts describe attitudes about NATO in non-member Mediterranean countries. For this reason, Felix Meier and Stephen Calleya, both of the University of Malta, question the need for an upgraded NATO presence in the Mediterranean:

Yet, an extension of NATO's military hardware to the Mediterranean is more likely to fuel the perception that exists across the southern shores of the basin that the Atlantic Alliance is seeking to establish some kind of outer zone of suzerainty in the area. An increased NATO military presence in the Mediterranean could also spur the very factors of instability that NATO is seeking to contain.⁸⁵

These "factors of instability" include the Islamic fundamentalist elements that stand ready to portray any U.S.-led move in the region as neo-imperialist. Considering that the most pressing problems in the region are socio-economic and not military, Meier and Calleya argue that actions by what is seen as a military alliance are unwise in the Mediterranean.⁸⁶

The NATO Mediterranean Initiative is further hampered by the lack of any clear consensus within NATO or the participating initiative countries about the direction the initiative should take in the future, or what its ultimate

⁸⁵ Felix Meier and Stephen Calleya, "Forward: U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwhfore.html> [20 August 2000]

⁸⁶ Meier and Cellaya, *ibid*.

aim should be.⁸⁷ When NATO members talk about security threats, they refer to external threats. For most of the non-NATO participants, the threats are primarily internal.⁸⁸ A modest initiative like the NATO Mediterranean Initiative is not designed to deal with these complexities, particularly because it has no clearly understood goal.

Some analysts still see value in the NATO Mediterranean Initiative: "Despite significant political impediments and a continuing degree of ambivalence on the part of participants, NATO's Mediterranean Initiative has served some very useful purposes."⁸⁹ These useful purposes consist mainly of channels of communication that otherwise would not have existed. But by itself the initiative cannot be a major force for promoting stability in the region. Ian Lesser, in analyzing NATO's intention to expand the initiative, attributes a greater role to the EU:

In my view, the European Union really has the leading role. If we look to the longer term relationship between North and South in the region, there is no question that the relationship with Europe is going to be the overwhelmingly important one, and the core issues of security are going to be the ones that the European Union will be best positioned to address — the social and the economic.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Asmus, et al, *ibid.*

⁸⁸ Green, *ibid.*

⁸⁹ Jerrold Green, Ian Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Michele Zanini, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), p. 30.

⁹⁰ Ian Lesser, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: A Transatlantic Perspective," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwhless.html> [20 July 2000]

With the its Mediterranean Initiative, NATO has made an attempt to break down some of the misunderstandings about the Alliance harbored by the countries of the southern Mediterranean. However, the initiative is severely limited by a lack of focus and the socio-economic (and non-military) nature of the region's instability. The NATO Mediterranean Initiative remains a modest initiative with modest results in a region with major problems.

Analysts such as Matthew Nimetz insist that NATO is indispensable to the region: "The PAX NATO is the only logical security regime to maintain security in the traditional sense. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle to implement this commitment for years to come."⁹¹ Certainly, the United States Sixth Fleet is the dominant naval force in the Mediterranean, but its effectiveness is qualified by three factors. First, as previously discussed, the region's problems are for the most part caused by socio-economic instability, not military threats.⁹² Second, the post-Cold War role of the United States in the region is still not clearly defined, a circumstance that raises questions about American interests in (and commitment to)

⁹¹ Matthew Nimetz, "Mediterranean Security after the Cold War," Available [Online]: <http://users.erols.com/mqmq/nimetz.htm> [10 August 2000]

⁹² Nicola de Santis, "The future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative," Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm> [24 August 2000]

the Mediterranean. Third, the Sixth Fleet is first and foremost an asset of the United States, not NATO.

E. THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

American interests in the Mediterranean are not necessarily identical to NATO interests. Ian Lesser has offered the following observation in this regard:

I would disagree slightly with those who maintain that the US engagement in the region is entirely synonymous with NATO's interests and presence. It is true that the US is a central actor in NATO. It is also true that the US is a key part of NATO's Mediterranean dialogue. But one cannot say that the US has been the most interested party in NATO's Mediterranean dialogue.⁹³

The impetus for initiatives for Mediterranean security, indeed for the new priority given to the region as a whole (beyond Israel), has not come from the United States. Southern European members of the EU and NATO have pushed for new initiatives to deal with issues that directly affect them, and the United States has not taken a leading role. Does the United States have compelling national interests in Mediterranean security?

George Joffé has noted the divergence between the United States and its European allies:

It is also increasingly clear that European and American interests in the region are diverging. For Europe, the Middle East crisis is part of its own diplomatic periphery. For the United States,

⁹³ Ian Lesser, "Respective roles of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/institute/occasion/occ14x.htm> [24 August 2000]

the Middle East is - despite congressional obsession and public concern over Iraq and Iran - now a strategic backwater in which only the question of Israeli stability retains official attention.⁹⁴

Such an analysis ignores the important American interests in the Mediterranean, not the least of which are maintaining secure access to the region's oil supply and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Nevertheless, Joffé, a British analyst, highlights the perception in the EU that America, as a global superpower, has strategic interests all over the world and does not define the Mediterranean as a particular priority. The United States government may determine that the nation has an interest in a region, but seldom is that interest direct, obvious, and tangible to the American public. The United States has asserted that it has interests in the Mediterranean, but the depth of its commitment to promoting and defending those interests is subject to change.

American interests may also change within a region.

Stephen Calleya has predicted such a change:

During the first ten years of the new millennium, the United States will shift its foreign policy concerns in the region further east, focusing on the management of relations in the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. The rest of the Mediterranean

⁹⁴ George Joffé, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona," Available [Online]: http://www.riia.org/briefing_papers/bp44.html [20 July 2000]

will become a EU sphere of influence once a common foreign and security policy is introduced.⁹⁵

As yet, the United States has not abandoned the Mediterranean to the EU, but they nevertheless differ in their approach. According to Stephen Blank, "the emphasis in Europe on threats stemming from underdeveloped Mediterranean economies' failure to modernize clashes with the U.S. tendency to see threats in more purely military terms and unilateralist approaches."⁹⁶ In other words, the United States defines its interests in the Mediterranean in ways that are at odds with the EU's approach.

F. A DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVES

At the heart of this difference is the classic American way of viewing the Mediterranean, as described by Ian Lesser:

The United States tends to take a very geo-strategic view of the region. We are present in terms of our 6th Fleet, commercially, or diplomatically, and so forth, but we are not physically a Mediterranean power so we're very interested in this idea that is really very old. It is 200 years old – but also was very important during the Cold War – that there is a strategic link that starts on the American East Coast and goes through the Azores and through the Western

⁹⁵ Stephen Calleya, "Regional Security Challenges in the Mediterranean," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 108. The term "Mashreq" translates from Arabic as "the Arab East," as opposed to "Maghreb," which translates as "the West." In modern usage, the Mashreq includes Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and sometimes also the Arabian Peninsula. The Maghreb is usually taken to include Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and on occasion, Libya.

⁹⁶ Stephen J. Blank, "Introduction," Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 12.

Mediterranean and goes out to areas of key strategic interest beyond the Gulf and the Caspian.⁹⁷

With this geo-strategic view, the United States approaches the problems of the region with priorities distinct from those of the EU. While the EU strives for stability on its southern flank, the United States wants a stable and clear path for military and commercial traffic across a vital waterway.

This inherent difference in priorities has led to parallel but at times uncoordinated approaches by the United States and the EU. Moreover, the United States has exhibited discomfort over the notion of a more active EU role in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).⁹⁸ But this is only half the story. According to Felix Meier and Stephen Calleya,

In reality, Americans have not offered to share responsibility for the security in the Middle East and Europeans have not volunteered to accept it. A number of factors suggest that both international patrons have been making a big mistake by adopting unilateral foreign policy positions towards this very important geo-strategic region of the world.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ian Lesser, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: A Transatlantic Perspective," *ibid.*

⁹⁸ Lesser, *ibid.*

⁹⁹ Meier and Calleya, *ibid.* Ian Lesser argues that much has changed over the last ten years. Efforts such as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) would not have been welcomed by Washington a decade ago, at least as they were then championed by France, but now are endorsed. However, the MEPP remains U.S.-dominated.

Meier and Calleya recommend a more balanced Euro-American partnership. This implies a greater role for the EU through its nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, regardless of the form the EU's participation takes, the central issue is not balance between American and EU priorities, but the differences between them.

Solving this dilemma is crucial.' As Ian Lesser observes,

The irony, I think, is that the U.S. has as much a stake as anybody, maybe more than Europe, in the idea of the Mediterranean as a global strategic space, because, in fact, we are the only power that is present right across the Mediterranean and that has interests right across the Mediterranean.¹⁰⁰

This is indeed ironic, because the American view of the Mediterranean as a strategic link is the basis for American involvement throughout the region. The resulting paradox is that American involvement, pervasive throughout the basin, necessitates adopting an approach more like that of the EU. By viewing the Mediterranean as not just a link but as a space in itself, the United States can better interact with the EU in Mediterranean matters. However, regardless of the approach, the strategic importance of the Mediterranean ensures the continued presence of the United

States in the region, with or without the EU's full cooperation.

G. THE U.S. AND THE EU: RIVALRY OR COOPERATION?

The relationship between the United States and the European Union is of central importance to both parties. The United States, with its NATO obligations, economic ties, and cultural affinities remains such a key player in Europe that it at times seems virtually a European country in its own right. The NATO Alliance has for fifty years been crucial on both sides of the Atlantic, and in most defense and security matters continues to be so.

This is not the case with the Barcelona Process (BP). From its inception, the BP was to be "European in inspiration,"¹⁰⁰ and as a result "in the actual conference itself, the United States was deliberately excluded."¹⁰² It appears that in order for the BP to be European, the United States could not be a player. How much of this kind of thinking was based on a genuine desire for the assertion of the EU's initiative in its own backyard, and how much was a reflection of an intention to develop an area of greater European influence to the exclusion of the United States? Is the BP the beginning of a Euro-Mediterranean bloc,

¹⁰⁰ Lesser, *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Joffé, *ibid.*

¹⁰² Joffé, "Economic Security in the Mediterranean," *ibid.*

formed to compete with East Asia and, most especially, with North America?

H. GLOBAL TRADE BLOCS

Many analysts have described the potential emergence of geo-political blocs following the end of the Cold War's bipolar world. Ronald Tiersky observes:

Integration is in the interest of the European states, medium and small-sized as they are, faced with the competitive pressures of a world led from the west by the United States and from the east by China and Japan. These European, American, and eastern blocs need not be mutually hostile for competition to be severe.¹⁰³

Although these blocs appear to be a natural extension of geography, with countries adjacent to each other developing trade agreements and clustering around strong economies, analysts such as James Spirling and Emile Kirchner see such blocs as potentially harmful:

The contemporary pattern of trade in the economic space encompassing the European security area does not augur well for the continued openness of the international trading system. The structural characteristics of trade on both the import and the export ledgers suggest at least a tripartite cleavage in the international trading system formed by the European bloc, an American bloc and an Asian bloc.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ronald Tiersky, "Europe Today: The Integration-Security Link," in Ronald Tiersky, ed., *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 446.

¹⁰⁴ James Spirling and Emil Kirchner, *Recasting the European Order: Security architectures and economic cooperation* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 133.

Spirling and Kirchner further contend that the United States already has an advantage with the formation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), signed in 1994 by the United States, Canada, and Mexico. They nonetheless maintain that the European bloc "remains the most fully formed and institutionally elaborated of the three identifiable regions," and "may also be buttressed along the southern periphery"¹⁰⁵ by the free trade area outlined in the Barcelona Declaration.

Henry Kissinger has envisioned further expansion for NAFTA as well:

A Western Hemisphere-wide free-trade system - with NAFTA as the initial step - would give the Americas a commanding role no matter what happens. If discriminatory regional groupings dominate, the Western Hemisphere, with its vast market, will be able to compete effectively with other regional trading blocs.¹⁰⁶

Indeed, in Kissinger's view, NAFTA's tremendous potential will either forestall the development of other trade blocs or ensure success if they emerge. In either case, NAFTA creates a force the EU must reckon with.

I. TOWARD A GREATER EUROPEAN TRADE BLOC?

In the face of such challenges, the Barcelona Process could be viewed as an attempt to strengthen the EU's position as a potential trading bloc. Although the means

¹⁰⁵ Spirling and Kirchner, *ibid*, p. 133.

were economic, the purpose was political. Geoffrey Edwards and Eric Philippart describe the motivation behind the BP as follows:

It was a political gesture that had at its core more practical economic concerns arising from a growing recognition that the EC/EU's policies towards the region had proved inadequate. They had neither ameliorated the problems of the Mediterranean region itself, nor had they created a base from which to meet more global economic pressures, including the prospect of regional blocs emerging in the Americas and the Pacific.¹⁰⁷

In other words, potential global trade blocs provided impetus to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The United States was naturally excluded because it represented a direct competitor in NAFTA. The Barcelona Process can thus be seen as a competitor to NAFTA and its potential to grow into a hemispheric trade bloc.

This attempt to create an economic bloc based in Europe but encompassing nations on its periphery reflects, if not comparative advantage, then at least the strength of the EU:

Although "Europe" does not yet exist in security and diplomatic terms, it is very real in economic and commercial terms, an actor whose power and influence will be strengthened by the coming of the euro. This is the only hope for Europeans to balance America – only in the monetary field does a new bipolarity seem within reach.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), p. 832.

¹⁰⁷ Geoffrey Edwards and Eric Philippart, "The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or ... ?", Available [Online]: <http://student.cusu.cam.ac.uk/cria/11-1/euomed.htm> [15 October 2000].

¹⁰⁸ Dominique Moïsi, "The Trouble with France," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1998, p.99.

It is only natural that the EU would seek to use the best tools it has at its disposal to compete with the United States. This analysis also explains why the United States was excluded from the BP. In this view, the EU did not invite the United States to participate in the BP because the BP was an initiative designed to improve the EU's ability to compete with the American bloc.

J. HEGEMONY AND GLOBALIZATION

This move to compete with the United States reflects at least two other related beliefs in the EU. The first belief is summed up by Samuel Huntington:

Undoubtedly, the single most important move toward an antihegemonic coalition, however, antedates the end of the Cold War: the formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency. As French Foreign Minister Hubert Védérine has said, Europe must come together on its own and create a counterweight to stop the United States from dominating a multipolar world.¹⁰⁹

In this view, the EU itself is protection against American dominance. Extended to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, cooperation between the EU and MPs is another hedge against U.S. dominance. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) provides such a hedge as well, reflecting the

¹⁰⁹ Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, p. 45.

EU's drive to balance the strength of the American dollar and the economy it represents.¹¹⁰

The second belief in the EU as to why it must compete with the United States derives from the controversy surrounding globalization. The anti-globalization movement in Europe, which is particularly strong in France, has a core anti-American (as well as anti-World Trade Organization) element. The specter of rampant and unstoppable globalization has elicited a virulent reaction in EU countries:

Some opponents of European integration [in France] in the early 1990's are now using the EU as a buffer to control globalization. Many French politicians have followed this trend; some of Brussels' most vocal opponents now praise the virtues of the EU as France's only realistic alternative to American-led globalization.¹¹¹

These two beliefs, that American hegemony must be checked and that globalization is a manifestation of that hegemony, lend weight to the BP as a means to compete with the United States. In describing the growing French popular opposition to globalization, Sophie Meunier sees a possible outcome: "If French politicians can join with their European partners to work out a sensible alternative to American-style globalization and find powerful allies in

¹¹⁰Erik Jones, "The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union," in Ronald Tiersky, ed., *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security* (Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 279.

other countries, the French backlash will echo well beyond France's borders."¹¹²

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership appears to be just such an initiative. In forming a trade bloc, the BP has taken a step counter to the current trend toward globalization. As Etel Solingen explains, "FTAs are not compatible with a full commitment to global multilateralism."¹¹³ George Joffé further describes the BP as a departure from the WTO:

The point is that under the WTO, all tariff levels are to be reduced. In effect, what the Barcelona Process did was to extend the tariff barrier one region out, so that the European Tariff area, as it were, was simply extended beyond to the southern frontiers of the states concerned. In that sense, there is an inherent contradiction.¹¹⁴

The BP is thus intertwined with efforts by EU countries, particularly France, to balance the United States in the world economy. But how much of this effort truly stems from the EU as a whole, rather than simply from France?

K. THE FRENCH FACTOR

Certainly, the French have led the way: "For his part, the Gaullist Chirac thunders about France's world

¹¹¹ Sophie Meunier, "The French Exception," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 79, No. 4, July/August 2000, p. 114.

¹¹² Meunier, *ibid.*, p. 116.

¹¹³ Solingen, *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Joffé, *ibid.*

role and the need for head-to-head confrontation with the United States."¹¹⁵ The Barcelona Process itself represents this drive of the French to blaze their own trail and distance themselves from the United States in the Mediterranean:

The French, indeed, have frequently emphasised, on one hand, the "Europeanness" of the Barcelona process against that of the peace process and its related initiatives, including the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) summits.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, the French position is not shared by all: "The French know all too well that their secret dream - to build a Europe that will challenge the United States - is the nightmare of their continental partners."¹¹⁷ This wariness of French ambitions extends to policies concerning the Mediterranean:

According to a senior German official, "some members" have concerns (probably misplaced or exaggerated) that France's goal is a Mediterranean bloc, protectionist and French-led, with North Africa bought off and stabilized by infusions of money provided by rich northern Europeans.¹¹⁸

However misplaced or exaggerated the concern, the BP contains at least a portion of these elements of bloc formation and protectionism. Although not the only target,

¹¹⁵ Meunier, *ibid.*, p. 111.

¹¹⁶ Edwards and Philippart, *ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Moïsi, *ibid.*, p. 97.

¹¹⁸ John Newhouse, *ibid.*, p. 275.

the United States is the primary focus of this protectionist sentiment.

L. COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

The relationship in the Mediterranean between the United States and the EU is thus a mixture of cooperation and competition. The NATO Mediterranean Initiative represents an effort to marshal American forces in conjunction with those of America's NATO allies (many of whom are key players in the EU) in a united effort, but the initiative is modest and stymied by NATO's image problem in the south. The view of the Mediterranean as a strategic link also causes the United States to have priorities distinct from those of the EU, particularly in the western Mediterranean. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the BP's origins include a French-led effort to create a trade bloc to compete with the United States and to counter the effects of globalization. Although efforts at transatlantic cooperation exist, the underlying theme is at times not cooperative and inclusive, but competitive and exclusionary.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VII. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions and make recommendations based on the information presented in previous chapters.

B. THE HYPOTHESES

This thesis has considered three hypotheses concerning the EU's possible motivations in initiating the Barcelona Process, in view of its implications, commitments, and costs. Although it is understood that no single motivation can entirely explain the EU's actions, the three hypothetical motivations are based on differing perceptions of not just the Mediterranean and/or the EU's role in the region, but of the EU itself. The extent to which the importance of each motivation can be determined may explain much about the origins of the Barcelona Process and, more importantly, its prospects for success.

The first hypothesis was that the BP was an act of generosity by the EU, which is perceived as giving economic help to its southern neighbors while fostering democracy and stability. According to this hypothesis, the long marginalized and poor countries of the Mediterranean are expected to benefit from increased economic cooperation

with the EU, which is to culminate in a free trade area between the EU and the MPs by 2010. This motivation for the BP was based on the perceived success of the formation of the EU itself, that is, the economic linkage of participating European countries through the ECSC, the EEC and the EC to a budding political union.

The second hypothesis was that the BP was an attempt by the EU to form a trade bloc, centered on the EU but encompassing its "near abroad" while excluding the United States. This "Greater European Bloc" would compete on at least equal footing with the "North American Bloc" centered on the United States and the "East Asian Bloc" coalescing around Japan and China.

The third hypothesis was that the Barcelona Process was designed to limit instability in the non-EU Mediterranean countries for the sole purpose of protecting Europe. According to this hypothesis, the growth of illegal immigration, transnational crime, and Islamic fundamentalism and perceptions of these phenomena as direct threats to EU countries drove the process and are imbedded in every facet of it. In short, this hypothesis holds that the BP uses EU money and incentives to influence the MPs to control the problems that could spill over into the EU.

C. EUROPEAN UNION GENEROSITY

Of these hypothetical motivations, the first has been the official basis for the Barcelona Process. But as discussed in Chapters III and IV, the BP's structure has been overwhelmingly favorable to the EU at the expense of the MPs and has been based on bilateralism as opposed to the multi-lateralism implied in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995.

Rather than help the MPs to develop their economies, the provisions developed in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have forced MPs to compete in areas in which they have had no advantage and have excluded them from areas, such as agriculture, in which they could effectively compete. The "partnership" has been unbalanced from the outset.

More telling has been the clear understanding that no political union is envisioned in the future for the MPs. The EU has been willing to talk about security and economics, but there is no possibility for EU enlargement to include the MPs (excepting Cyprus, Malta, and possibly Turkey, which have all gained "candidate status" for EU membership). This fact more than any other invalidates the notion that the BP is a replay of the process that formed the EU. According to George Joffé's analysis of the

Barcelona Process, it is "a security arrangement and not a gesture of generosity."¹¹⁹

D. EURO-MEDITERRANEAN TRADE BLOC

The second hypothesis about EU motivation is supported by the evidence. As shown in Chapter VI, the formation of a "European Trade Bloc" and highly charged anti-globalization sentiments aimed at curbing American influence are prominent in the European Union, particularly in France. However, as a motivation behind the Barcelona Process such sentiments are not of primary importance. Outside France and the protectionist political parties of most European Union countries these motivations are not strong. Britain, Germany, and most of the EU's northern tier are committed to retaining the American involvement in European affairs with little of the French bluster about American cultural and economic imperialism, as shown in Chapter V. Although trade blocs and anti-globalization sentiments were factors in forming the Barcelona Process, they have been additive rather than central to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

A more fundamental part of the BP has been the desire to exclude the United States and thereby keep the BP "European." This has been less about anti-Americanism than

¹¹⁹ George Joffé, "Economic Security in the Mediterranean," Available [Online]:

about developing influence centered in the EU and not the Atlantic Alliance. America's preoccupation with the Mediterranean as a strategic link contributes to this. EU countries know that the Mediterranean is adjacent to them and that the United States has no such interest by proximity. From this perspective, the BP reflects the European Union's interest in containing instability that could affect it directly.

E. REACTION TO INSTABILITY

The third hypothesis about the EU's motivation is most fully vindicated by the evidence. That is, fear of instability is the prime mover behind the BP. The EU is responding to concerns about illegal immigration, transnational crime, Islamic fundamentalism, and other phenomena associated with the south that have spawned such virulent reactions in EU countries, from Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front in France to Jörg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria. In other words, the BP was motivated by symptoms, although it is designed to address the causes of instability as well. To do this, the EU has offered the "carrot-on-a-stick" of financial aid and a free trade area to entice the MPs to sign on to the BP, and in return expects action to be taken in the areas that EU countries

<http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mtl/wwwjofc.html> [20 August 2000]

consider threats, such as illegal immigration and transnational crime. According to George Joffé's analysis,

the Barcelona Process is not an act of generosity by Europe, as some believe. Even though the Declaration refers to creating a zone of shared peace and prosperity, it is actually a statement about European security. Even though people in the South might take a generous attitude towards the European vision and argue that the process really was an attempt to avoid creating a "Fortress Europe," I shall argue that it was designed to do precisely that.¹²⁰

F. THE STUMBLING BLOCKS

By insisting on European centrality in the process, the exclusion of the United States, and the maintenance of protectionism for the EU in bilateralism as opposed to multi-lateralism, the EU has managed to both reinforce MP fears about EU domination and ensure that the most powerful nation on earth is not part of the solution.

The BP is not advancing, despite EU claims to the contrary. For example, few analysts realistically expect the centerpiece of the initiative, the FTA, to be formed by 2010, if ever. As Stephen Blank observes, "By all accounts, the EU's Barcelona Process and the EU's Mediterranean Dialogue appear to be marking time."¹²¹ The

¹²⁰ Joffé, *ibid.*

¹²¹ Stephen Blank, "Introduction," in Stephen Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 12.

result is an initiative that seems increasingly focused on "boundary maintenance," not regional cooperation.¹²²

The danger inherent in this lack of progress and questionable commitment to furthering the BP has been described by George Joffé:

One should not forget that, in reality, the demographic problems of the region are so vast and the demands that they make are so great that the kinds of changes we are talking about will take place far too slowly to prevent them from having a knock-down political effect.¹²³

In other words, the ponderous slowness of the BP renders it incapable of diffusing the tensions that could cause violent upheavals (such as the Algerian unrest since 1992). Neither the symptoms of instability that prompted the Barcelona Process nor the underlying conflicts and pressures that are at the root of the southern Mediterranean region's problems are going to disappear. To what extent can the Barcelona Process offer solutions?

G. SOLUTIONS

Based on the problems with the BP, what changes could contribute to a more functional and productive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

First, motivations must shift. The EU must recognize not just the inequalities in the current circumstances but

¹²² Blank, *ibid.*, p. 12.

¹²³ Joffé, *ibid.*

the inequalities in the solutions it has proposed. The exclusive use of bilateral EU-MP agreements, the trade provisions that favor the EU, and the EU's insistence on dictating standards may hamper the economic development of MPs and increase resentment among those the BP is supposed to assist. The EU must make a more credible and effective effort to treat MPs as partners, not the recipients of charity.

Furthermore, the EU must abandon cultural biases. As Ghassan Salamé explains:

Nobody can build a genuine partnership while constructing the other, with shaky arguments, into an adversary. Europe, if it really pursues a relationship that goes further than being a trade partner, has to free itself from the obsessive search of new enemies, from a fortress mentality as well as from Crusade nostalgia.¹²⁴

While the MPs have biases of their own, the BP is an EU initiative and as such has been formed with EU perspectives in mind.

Of equal importance is the need for recognition of the true nature of Mediterranean instability: internal, non-military tensions. According to Ian Lesser,

There is a structural role that the EU has in the political economy of the south, which also has a security dimension. It is true that the security challenges in the Mediterranean are not generally North-South but rather South-South, but it may be

¹²⁴ Ghassan Salamé, "Europe and the Mediterranean: The Future of the Barcelona Process," Available [Online]: <http://www.ieu.it/RSC/MED/Salame.htm> [20 August 2000].

added further that most of them are really internal.¹²⁵

The EU can play a critical role in helping MP countries address their internal problems, which in most cases originate from weak economies. For progress to be made in this area, the EU must move beyond rhetoric and allow MPs to compete where they may succeed: agriculture.

Second, the EU should take the lead in promoting dialogue and cooperation with the southern Mediterranean countries, while NATO's role should be carefully circumscribed. NATO is still seen as a threat in the southern Mediterranean region, and the Atlantic Alliance's involvement in the Euro-Mediterranean relationship should therefore be limited at this time. Convincing the MPs that the EU's focus is not only to the east will probably be difficult enough without making a great effort to modify perceptions of NATO at the same time. Moreover, NATO has much to do, anyway, in view of its new crisis management and peacekeeping tasks in the Balkans.

Third, despite the limited role for NATO in the southern Mediterranean region, the United States must be actively involved in the Barcelona Process. Simply put, America must have a stake in the BP for the initiative to

¹²⁵Ian Lesser, "Respective roles of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean," *ibid.*

succeed. This adjustment would not sacrifice "Europeanness," but rather would recognize the reality that the United States is a major player in the region.

Central to this American involvement is the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The MEPP is not tied formally to the BP, but it is in fact (given the political dynamics of the region) inseparable from it:

It [the MEPP] proved to be a contentious issue and one that illustrated a fundamental difficulty or weakness in the Barcelona approach, the impossibility of keeping it and the Middle East peace process 'separate but complementary.'¹²⁶

This circumstance increases the American stake and underscores (a) the reality of the MEPP's influence on anything the EMP does, and (b) the vital role the United States plays in the MEPP. The exclusion of the United States from the Barcelona Conference was intended to define the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as an independent European process. However, the greater goals of the process are regional stability and prosperity. The attainment of these goals requires United States participation, and the lack of American involvement has been a hindrance from the beginning. EU "independence" from Washington has led the EU to pay a high price in missed opportunities.

Fourth, the EU must develop a common foreign and security policy that goes beyond pursuing economic advantages for itself or ensuring a "fortress Europe." The split between the EU's northern and southern tiers must be addressed, and compromises must be reached, because a consistent, united approach is needed to reassure wary MPs. Most importantly, the EU should work more closely with the United States to devise long term solutions.

Ironically, the goals set forth in the Barcelona Declaration have the best chance of being attained if the European Union can provide leadership that matches the rhetoric that emerged from the Barcelona Conference of 1995. The EU must shake off the protectionist tendencies that have thus far kept the MPs from benefiting from the initiative. The EU will need to solicit the active involvement and cooperation of the United States in resolving the local conflicts that consistently undermine efforts to stabilize the region. Above all, the EU must define a common foreign and security policy that includes close cooperation with the United States and that eschews an approach dominated by self-interest and boundary maintenance. The result may then be a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that is more than nominal.

¹²⁶ Edwards and Philippart, *ibid.*

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Alboni, Roberto, "European Union Security Perceptions and Policies Towards the Mediterranean," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 133.
- Asmus, Ronald, Larrabee, F. Stephen, and Lesser, Ian, "Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks," Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-6.htm> [14 July 2000]
- Bergsten, Fred C., "America and Europe: Clash of the Titans?" *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, pp. 20-34.
- Blank, Stephen J., "Introduction," Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 12.
- Calleya, Stephen, "Regional Security Challenges in the Mediterranean," in Blank, Stephen J., ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 108.
- Cameron, Fraser, "The European Union and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwcamr.html> [11 June 2000]
- De Santis, Nicola, "The future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative," Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm> [24 August 2000]
- Edwards, Geoffrey and Philippart, Eric, "The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or ... ?", Available [Online]: <http://student.cusu.cam.ac.uk/cria/11-1/euomed.htm> [15 October 2000].
- El-Sayed Selim, Mohammed, "Arab Perceptions of the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Projects," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millennium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 143.
- "Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership—the Barcelona Conference," Available [Online]: <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/euomed.html> [20 June 2000]
- Final Communiqué issues at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 1 December 1994, Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm> [11 November 2000]
- Friedman, Thomas and Ramonet, Ignacio, "Dueling Globalizations." *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1999, pp. 110-127.
- Gillespie, Richard, "Northern European Perspectives of the Barcelona Process," Available [Online]: <http://www.cidob.es/Castellano/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.html> [23 August 2000].
- Green, Candy, "Enhancing NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwhgren.html> [20 August 2000]
- Green, Jerrold, Larrabee, F. Stephen, Lesser, Ian, and Zanini, Michele, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), p. 30.
- Huntington, Samuel, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1999, p. 45.
- Joffé, George, "Economic Security in the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwhjofe.html> [10 June 2000]

Joffé, George "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona", Available [Online]: <http://www.riia.org/briefingpapers/bp44.html> [10 June 2000]

Jones, Erik, "The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union," in Ronald Tiersky, ed., *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security* (Lanhan, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 279.

Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), p. 832.

Larrabee, F. Stephen and Thorson, Carla, *Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges*, Conference Proceedings, Brussels, October 15-17, 1995, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), p. 12.

Lesser, Ian, "Respective roles of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/institute/occasion/occ14x.htm> [24 August 2000]

Lesser, Ian, "The New Mediterranean Security Environment: A Transatlantic Perspective," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwhless.html> [11 June 2000].

Lewis, Bernard, "The West and the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1997, pp. 114-130.

Meier, Felix and Calleya, Stephen, "Forward: U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/mt1/wwwhfore.html> [20 August 2000]

Meunier, Sophie, "The French Exception," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 79, No. 4, July/August 2000, p. 114.

Moïsi, Dominique, "The Trouble with France," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1998, p.99.

Nasouli, Salem M., Bisat, Amer, and Kanaan, Oussama, "The European Union's New Mediterranean Strategy," *Finance and Development*, September 1996, pp. 14-17.

Newhouse, John, *Europe Adrift* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997), p. 276.

Nimetz, Matthew, "Mediterranean Security after the Cold War," Available [Online]: <http://users.erols.com/mqmq/nimetz.htm> [10 August 2000]

Patten, Chris, "The European Union's External Policy and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.it/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_116.htm (3 June 2000)

Patten, Chris, "The European Union's external policy and the Mediterranean: the case for Israel," Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.it/comm/external_relations/news/patten/speech_00_134.htm (3 June 2000).

Ragionieri, Rodolfo, "Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), p. 423.

Richards, Andrew J., "Spain: From Isolation to Integration," in Ronald Tiersky, ed., *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 190.

Salamé, Ghassan, "Europe and the Mediterranean: The Future of the Barcelona Process," Available [Online]: <http://www.ieu.it/RSC/MED/Salamc.htm> [20 August 2000].

Sha'ath, Nabil, *Untitled Speech, The Conference of Europe and Palestine, 1-3 October 1998*, Available [Online]: http://www.pna.net/speeches/nabil_sha'ath.htm [20 July 2000]

Solana, Javier, "NATO and the Mediterranean," Available [Online]:
<http://users.erols.com/mqmq/solana.htm> [14 July 2000]

Solana, Javier, speech of 10 November 1997, Available [Online]:
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971110a.htm> [20 August 2000]

Solingen, Etel, "Constructing a Mediterranean Region: Cultural and Functional Perspectives," Available [Online]: http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/conference_papers/cmr_solingen.html [20 July 2000]

Spirling, James and Kirchner, Emil, *Recasting the European Order: Security architectures and economic cooperation* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 133.

Tiersky, Ronald, "Europe Today: The Integration-Security Link," in Ronald Tiersky, ed., *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. 446.

Yost, David, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 401

Zuconi, Mario, "NATO in the Mediterranean," in Stephen J. Blank, ed., *Mediterranean Security Into the Coming Millenium* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), pp. 115-116.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
2. Dudley Knox Library 2
Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
3. Director, Training and Education 1
MCCDC, Code C46
1019 Elliot Road
Quantico, VA 22134-5107
4. Director, Marine Corps Research Center 2
MCCDC, Code C40RC
2040 Broadway Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5107
5. Marine Corps Representative 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Code 037, Bldg. 330, Ingersoll Hall, Room 116
555 Dyer Road
Monterey, CA 93943
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 1
Technical Advisory Branch
Attn: Librarian
Box 555171
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5080
7. CAPT Fredrick Rocker, USN, Code NS/Rf 1
Naval Postgraduate School
1411 Cunningham Road
Monterey, CA 93943-5218
8. Professor David S. Yost, Code NS/Yo 1
Naval Postgraduate School
1411 Cunningham Road
Monterey, CA 93943-5218

9. Colonel Tjarck G. Roessler, GA, Code NS/Rt 1
Naval Postgraduate School
1411 Cunningham Road
Monterey, CA 93943-5218
10. Major Richard E. Myrick 3
P.O. Box 4329
Dorrington, CA 95223